Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public

Recapitalisation and Rescue of Financial Institutions During

Periods of Financial Crises (Part I) by Ojo, Mariane.B. & Rodriguez-Miguez, J.A.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1924887
ABSTRACT
In  response  to  the  recent  Financial  Crisis  -  after  it  had  been  widely  accepted  that  “a  serious 
disturbance  in  the  economy of  Member  States”  had  occurred,  and  that  several  measures  were 
required  to  remedy  this  disturbance,  various  Commission  communications  were  adopted.  The 
Communications  include:  The first  Communication which (initially),  was  the only one that  the 
Commission adopted intentionally:  the  Communication on the application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial 
crisis (hereinafter "the Banking Communication").
 However, faced with the pressure to issue more guidelines (such pressure being exerted by Member 
States),  the  Commission  adopted  three  further  Communications:  the  Communication on the re 
capitalisation of financial  institutions in the current financial  crisis:  limitation of aid to the 
minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition  (hereinafter  "the 
Recapitalisation Communication"); the Communication “On the treatment of impaired assets in the 
Community banking  sector”  (hereinafter,  “the  Toxic  Assets  Comunication”)  and  finally,  the 
Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis  under the State aid rules (hereinafter  "the  Restructuring 
Communication").” 
Whilst the Banking and Re capitalisation Communications constituted the focus of study in Part I 
to this paper, this paper will focus on the impact of shadow banking and Basel III on regulatory 
arbitrage, the corresponding need for greater transparency and disclosure within financial markets – 
particularly within  OTC markets,  and  impediments  to  the  successful  implementation  of  capital 
requirements  which  are  aimed  at  fostering  financial  stability,  coordination  and  harmonisation. 
Further, it  will  consider the extent to which regulators are prepared to deviate from regulations 
during the implementation of stress-testing and rescue programmes which are aimed at restoring 
stability to the financial system.
The  redefinition  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  standards  for  capital,  in  implementing  the 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Programme (SCAP), as illustrated in the paper, should demonstrate 
the extent to which regulators, independent of shadow banking practices, are prepared to deviate 
from capital  regulations  under  adverse  scenarios  where  certain  regulations  prove  to  be  unduly 
stringent.
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Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), market discipline
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Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public Recapitalisation 
and Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of Financial Crises 
(Part II)*1
Introduction
Financial Stability Measures, Counter Party Risks and the Shadow Banking System
„Over the past decade, the shadow banking system provided sources of inexpensive funding for 
credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like and seemingly riskless short-
term liabilities.“2
The risks posed by the operation of such instruments, vehicles and activities to financial stability, is 
not  only  evident  by  counter  party  risks  which  emanate  from such  complex  and  sophisticated 
instruments, the level of uncertainty attributed to lack of transparency within the financial markets, 
but also those risks inherent in the funding of maturities particularly those attributed to short term 
liabilities. 
The shadow banking system has the potential to trigger systemic risks through the provision of 
credit,  maturity and liquidity transformations – a situation which could arise where parts of the 
shadow banking system are able to function without “internalizing the true costs of its risks – hence 
gaining  a  funding  advantage  relative  to  banks  where  regulation  aims  to  achieve  such  an 
internalization – which is likely to create opportunities for arbitrage that might undermine bank 
regulation and lead to a build up of additional leverage and risks in the system.“3
As highlighted under the abstract, this paper, in constrast to Part I of the paper, will focus on rescue 
efforts,  assessment  and  stress  testing  programmes  which  unintentionally,  could  result  in  the 
facilitation of regulatory arbitrage. Such efforts and other initiatives being primarily promulgated as 
measures aimed at  facilitating financial  stability.  Whilst  the new Basel  III  framework is  highly 
commended, debates have also arisen in relation to whether it could trigger as many problems as 
those which it has been designed to rectify. Nevertheless, this paper will highlight why it is crucial 
to ensure that the goals, objectives and initiatives of Basel III in promoting financial stability – 
1  Paper to be presented at the 2012 IBFR (Institute for Business & Finance Research) COSTA RICA 
CONFERENCIA/ CONGRESO GLOBAL ADMINISTRACION Y FINANZAS SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA: MAYO 
22-25, 2012. For further details on the Conference, please visit http://www.theibfr.com/costaricaesp.htm
2 See  Zoltan  Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky , „Shadow Banking“ Staff Report No 458 
July 2010, Federal Reserve Bank of New York  http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf at page 
2 of 81 (abstract of the paper). Shadow banking is considered to comprise of „ financial intermediaries that conduct 
maturity,  credit,  and  liquidity  transformation  without  access  to  central  bank  liquidity  or  public  sector  credit 
guarantees.  Examples  of  shadow  banks  include  finance  companies,  asset-backed  commercial  paper  (ABCP) 
conduits,  limited-purpose finance companies,  structured investment vehicles,  credit  hedge funds,  money market 
mutual funds, securities lenders, and government-sponsored enterprises.“ see ibid.
3  “The provision of maturity/liquidity transformation and leverage could make credit intermediation by non bank 
entities “bank-alike” and raise concerns for authorities to the extent that they create systemic risks.“ See Financial 
Stability Board,  „Shadow Banking:  Scoping the  Issues  (A Background Note  of  the  Financial  Stability  Board) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf at page 3 (page 5 of 11)
particularly its focus on macro prudential stability, are not undermined.
Recapitalisation and rescue schemes,  as well  as other financial  stability plans and programmes, 
whilst aiming to restore financial  stability through the most effective and least  time consuming 
means,  should also take into account other  important considerations such as the objectives and 
intent of certain regulations – particularly those which not only embrace the same goals of the 
attainment of financial stability, but also other vital goals of harmonisation, coordination between 
different jurisdictions. Basel III provides an excellent example of such as regulation. Where the 
implementation  of  certain  programmes  in  exceptional  scenarios  result  in  deviations  from  key 
regulations, the danger that regulatory arbitrage practices will be facilitated not only exists, but also 
the likelihood that lack of coordination and harmonisation will occur across jurisdictions. 
This  paper  will  highlight  the fact  that  exceptional  situations  have resulted in  derogations  from 
certain norms – however such deviations could be justified in certain cases – particularly in view of 
the importance attached to the goal of achieving speedy financial recovery as well as where these 
situations are intended to be one-off scenarios. Emergency legislation designed to address short 
term and serious disruptions to the economy/adverse scenarios, or unprecedented deviations from 
the norm under  adverse scenarios,  it  should be  pointed  out,  should also be distinguished from 
rampant practices deliberately aimed at circumventing key and/or not so central capital legislation.
The paper commences with a section which is aimed at underlining the importance of stress tests in 
promoting  transparency and  disclosure  across  the  financial  markets  –  such  measures  aimed  at 
facilitating market discipline. The section will also introduce types of regulatory arbitrage which 
which are likely to result in the circumvention of capital requirements designed to „manage linkages 
and prudently conduct negotiations“ between vital financing channels.
Section  two  then  elaborates  on  rescue  and  financial  stability  measures  which  have  been 
implemented in  the European Union,  as  well  as  the  United States.  The section also re-iterates 
certain observations drawn from the first part to the paper – whereby a more lenient stance has been 
adopted by the Commission as a means of ensuring that the all important goal of avoiding „serious 
disturbances to the economy of Member States“ is attained. This scenario, being peculiar to the EU, 
is  then  used  as  the  building  block  for  the  next  section  (section  three)  which  will  address  the 
exceptional  scenarios  whereby  supervisors  in  the  US  have  deviated  from  standard  capital 
requirements.  Within  this  context,  the  implementation  of  the  Supervisory  Capital  Assessment 
Program (SCAP), comprising the 2009 stress tests which constituted a “special forward-looking 
assessment exercise” to “evaluate expected losses and the resources to absorb those losses” will be 
considered. The section will also aim to deduce whether one-off deviations by supervisors during 
the implementation of the SCAP could be justified – where such deviations imply derogations from 
key legislation such as the Basel Accords.
Concerns attributed to the new Basel III framework relate to its “facilitation of the shadow banking 
system  whilst  constraining  the  bank  sector.”4 The  new,  more  stringent  capital  and  liquidity 
requirements introduced through Basel III are likely to impact the more highly regulated banking 
sector since it is likely that there will be greater incentives to transact in less stringent regulated 
sectors such as the shadow banking system or through less stringent regulated capital instruments. 
 
In concluding the paper, the final section will also highlight why coordination and harmonisation 
are central to the goal of mitigating regulatory arbitrage practices.
4  See BRIEF,  „Deutsche Bank CFO Says  Concerned  New Basel  Rules  Allow Shadow Banking System Whilst 
Constraining Bank Sector“ < http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2011-05/20264700-briefdeutsche-bank-
cfo-says-concerned-new-basel-rules-allow-shadow-banking-system-020.htm
A. Stress Tests : Facilitating Greater Transparency and Disclosure Within the Financial Markets
“In order to ensure financial stability, the Commission should review and report on measures to 
enhance the transparency of OTC markets, to mitigate the counterparty risks and more generally to 
reduce the overall risks, such as by clearing of credit default swaps through central counterparties 
(CCPs). The establishment and development of CCPs in the EU subject to high operational and 
prudential  standards  and  effective  supervision  should  be  encouraged.  The  Commission  should 
submit  its  report  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  together  with  any  appropriate 
proposals, taking into account parallel initiatives at the global level as appropriate.”5
Stress testing not only serves as an important risk management tool – particularly for counter party 
risk management,6 but has also been identified as a means whereby investors' uncertainty about the 
quality of bank balance sheets could be eliminated.7
In  addition  to  the  trading  book  and  securitisation  reforms  announced  in  July  2009,  the  Basel 
Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  proposed the  consolidation  of  the  capital  requirements  for 
counterparty credit risk exposures arising from derivatives and securities financing activities.
These enhancements are aimed at strengthening the resilience of individual banking institutions and 
reducing the risk of shocks being transmitted from one institution to another through the derivatives 
and financing channel. Consolidated counterparty capital requirements should increase incentives to 
transfer OTC derivative exposures to central counterparties and exchanges.
However,   three  forms  of  arbitrage  which  are  likely  to  result  in  the  circumvention  of  capital 
requirements designed to „manage linkages and prudently conduct negotiations“ between channels, 
broker-dealer  and  asset  management  subsidiaries,  as  well  as  credit  intermediation  have  been 
identified as follows:
− Cross border regulatory systems arbitrage
− Regulatory tax and economic capital arbitrage
− Ratings arbitrage.
These forms of arbitrage, as identified by Pozsar et al, are also considered by them to have emerged 
from:8 i) the fractured nature of the global financial regulatory framework, ii) the dependence of 
capital adequacy rules (Basel II) on credit ratings and iii) „a collection of one - off, uncoordinated 
decisions  by accounting  and regulatory  bodies  regarding  the  accounting  and  regulatory capital 
5  See DIRECTIVE 2009/111/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 September 
2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central 
institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management at page 5 of 
23.
6 See Bank for International Settlements, Consultative Document, „Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking 
Sector „ at page 48
7 See also European Commission, „“Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, section 3.2.1 
Crisis Resolution Policies: Stress Testing of Banks“ < 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf > It is also highlighted in the report that 
stress tests could serve as “decisive tools in accomplishing this task since they provide information about banks’ 
resilience and ability to absorb possible shocks.”
8 Z Pozsar et al,  „Shadow Banking“ Staff Report No 458 July 2010, Federal Reserve Bank of New York at pages 37 
and 38 of 81 (pages 29 and 30). http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf
treatment of certain exposures , lending and asset manegment activities.“
Further evidence which may or may not justify a deviation from standard capital requirements will 
be  considered  under  section  C  by  way  of  reference  to  the  Supervisory  Capital  Assessment 
Programme – a programme which was initiated in February 2009 as a means of assessing capital 
needs of banking institutions as well as restoring financial stability back to the US financial system 
and markets following the devastating consequences and impact of the Financial Crisis which was 
triggered in 2007.  Such a programme will be contrasted with other proposals relating to forward 
looking provisions.
B. Consideration of Adverse Scenarios and Serious Disruptions to the Economy.
Several stages were identified by the Commission in its Communication9 as phases through which 
the route from financial instability to financial stability are to be achieved. These are as follows:
i) Stabilisation of the Crisis
ii) Restructuring the banking sector
iii) Hand-over of banks to the private sector at some stage in the future
Certain  financial  stability  and  rescue  measures  which  have  been  implemented  by  various 
jurisdictions  all  share  the  common  feature  of  the  more  relaxed  and  flexible  attitude  which 
governments and supervisors have demonstrated where urgent and exceptional decisions need to be 
instigated to restore confidence and stability back to the financial system.
As highlighted in the predecessor to this paper (Part One),10 the Commission’s resort to the “rarely 
used and more lenient provision of Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty, during the recent Financial Crisis, to 
authorise national recovery plans and individual rescue measures”11 is an explicit illustration of its 
commitment to goals aimed at facilitating economic stability through the aversion of “ a serious 
disturbance  in  the  economy of  Member  States.” Its  realisation  of  the  need  to  implement  this 
provision occurred after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy – the first case to be decided under 
Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty being Bradford and Bingley.
In respect of Northern Rock, and with respect to the legal basis of the Commission’s decisions, the 
rescue decision and the decision of 2 April 2008 to open the formal investigation procedure, were 
taken on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines - 
the reason for this being that the Commission considered the difficulties faced by Northern Rock to 
be linked specifically to Northern Rock – therefore not justifying the application of Article 87(3)(b)
of the Treaty.
As the severity of  the Financial  Crisis  affected more and more banks,  in  September  2008, the 
Commission considered the application of Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty, to banks that were in receipt
of State aid, to be necessary thereafter. 
9  See  European  Commission,  Communication  from  the  Commission_  From  Financial  Crisis  to  Recovery:  A 
European  Framework  for  Action  at  page  3  29.10.2008  COM  (2008)  706  final  <  http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0706:FIN:EN:PDF>
10  See Rodriguez – Miguez J and Ojo M, “Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation and 
Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of Financial Crisis” and also M Ojo, „Central Banks and Different 
Policies Implemented in Response to the Recent Financial Crisis“ 
11  See D Gerard, „Managing the Financial Crisis in Europe: Why Competition Law is Part of the Solution, Not of the 
Problem” Global Competition Review December 2008 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1330326> at page 6
In the United States, public recapitalisation served as a general means of confronting the Financial 
Crisis. As noted under Part I to this paper, under preliminary and substantive observations, it must 
be  highlighted  that  competition  (Antitrust)  considerations  have  not  been  taken  into  account  in 
contrast to European State Aids instruments which serve as an essential component of European 
Competition Law.
On October 14 2008, the following „watershed“ measures aimed at rescuing the ailing U.S. Markets 
were announced by the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC:
- the Capital Purchase Programme"
- the FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
- the Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility
Another national recovery plan, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), comprised 
the 2009 stress tests which constituted a “special forward-looking assessment exercise” to “evaluate 
expected losses and the resources to absorb those losses” if economic conditions deteriorated worse 
than generally expected.12
The European Banking Federation (EBF), is supportive of the provisioning based on Expected Loss 
model  and  recommended  a  provisioning  model  based  on  the  EL concept,  which  “captures  the 
economic reality of the lending activities of financial institutions in line with the six principles of 
the  Bank for  International  Settlements”  in  order  to  achieve  sound Expected  Loss  provisioning 
approach.13
C. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP): A Deviation from Basel Capital 
Rules?
This section attempts to highlight the fact that whilst supervisors still consider capital regulations to 
be  unduly  stringent  under  adverse  conditions,  such  stringency  has  been  increased  with  the 
introduction of Basel III. Basel III is not intended to make life more difficult for banks or bank 
holding companies – Basel III's more stringent nature is largely attributed to the much urgently 
needed response to the recent Financial Crisis. However, it appears that even greater deviation from 
capital rules will occur following the introduction of Basel III – than was the case with Basel II.
Basel III not only embraces a micro prudential framework (an enhanced Basel II) which is aimed at:
− Increasing the quality of, as well as improving the quantity of capital;
− Enhancing risk managment and disclosure;
− Introducing a leverage ratio to supplement risk-weighted measures,
− Addressing counterparty credit risk generated through Over-the-Counter derivatives; 
12 „The Capital Assistance Program not only aimed at assessing capital needs via comprehensive stress tests of major 
banking institutions, but also ensuring that any projected capital shortfalls were met by private investors and, if 
necessary,  government  infusions.“  See  AE  Wall,  „Stress  Tests  and  Market  Discipline“  Banking  and  Financial 
Services  Policy Report  Volume 30 No 9 September 2011 at  page 2.  See also  US Department of  the Treasury, 
Treasury White Paper: The Capital Assistance Program and Its Role in the Financial Stability Plan 2 (Feb. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Treasury White Paper].
13  European  Banking Federation,  Comments  on  consultative  documents  issued  by Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision “Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector” and “International Framework for Liquidity
Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” at page 6 
<http://www.finansraadet.dk/media/208544/ebf_hoeringssvar_international_framework_for_liquidity_risk_measu
rement_standards_and_monitoring_150410.pdf>
but  also  a  macro  prudential  component  which  is  designed  to  address  stability  over  time 
(procyclicality) – through counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning, capital 
conservation rules for strongercapital buffers; and stability at each point in time.14
Providing for adverse scenarios and in their assessment of whether bank holding companies had 
sufficient15 capital to absorb losses under such advserse conditions, the degree and extent to which 
supervisors were prepared to deviate from standard capital rules in their implementation of SCAP, is 
illustrated thus:16
− Supervisors  were not content  with the traditional  definition of Tier  1  risk-based capital, 
focusing instead on “Tier 1 common capital” or that  percentage of Tier 1 capital that is 
common equity.
− Supervisors  traditionally preferred  common stockholders’ equity and mandated  it  be  the 
majority component of Tier 1 capital, but SCAP marked the first time supervisors defined a 
minimum amount of Tier 1 capital that must be comprised of common equity.17
− After redefining the qualitative standards for capital they would use for SCAP, supervisors 
then established a new quantitative standard: under the adverse scenario, BHCs subject to 
SCAP would need a Tier 1 capital buffer of at least 6% and Tier 1 common capital buffer of 
at least four percent at year-end 2010. Previously BHCs were only required to maintain a 
minimum Tier  1  capital  buffer  of  four  percent,  although supervisors  generally expected 
BHCs to maintain capital levels in excess of the minimum standard.“18
The  composition  of  Tier  1  capital,  as  prescribed  by  regulation  and  evidenced  by  the  Basel 
Committee's efforts aimed at improving the quality of capital, is illustrated in the table below:19
14 „The stability at each point in time component comprises of systemic capital surcharges for systemically important 
financial institutions and the identification of interlinkages and common exposures among all financial institutions, 
as  well  as  the systemic oversight  of  OTC derivatives.  See H Hannoun,  „Towards  a  Global  Financial  Stability 
Framework“  Bank  for  International  Settlements  Publications,  page  9  of  26 
<http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
15 Supervisors' focus being on  „both the amount and composition of capital held by each of the BHCs.“ 
16 See  AE Wall, „Stress Tests and Market Discipline“ Banking and Financial Services Policy Report Volume 30 No 9 
September 2011 at page 5.
17  „This revised emphasis on common equity being justified as follows:The SCAP’s emphasis on what is termed “Tier 
1 Common capital” reflects the fact that common equity is the first element of the capital structure to absorb losses,  
offering protection to more senior parts of the capital structure and lowering the risk of insolvency. All else equal, 
Tier 1 Common capital gives a BHC greater permanent loss absorption capacity and greater ability to conserve 
resources under stress by changing the amount and timing of dividends and other distributions.“ see ibid.
18„Supervisors stressed these were not new capital standards,  but rather a “onetime buffer [that] will give market 
participants, as well as the firms themselves, confidence in the capacity of the major BHCs to perform their critical role 
in lending, even if the economy proves weaker than expected.” see ibid.
19 Source: See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements 
Publications, page 11 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
According  to  Wall,20 through  the  exclusion  of  preferred  equity,  supervisors  ensured  dividend 
payments  would  not  unnecessarily  deplete  earnings,  whilst  also  excluding  the  preferred  equity 
received by the US government via the TARP21 capital infusions made in 2008.
In assessing whether supervisors' decisions to exclude preferred equity is justified, consideration 
must be had to regulatory aims and objectives of the reformed rules – as embodied by the Basel III 
framework. A general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. This 
is attributed to its wide risk categories which provide banks with the liberty to “arbitrage between 
their economic assessment of risk and the regulatory capital requirements.”22  Hence Basel II was 
introduced to address such (and other) deficiencies of the original Basel Accord. Should a deviation 
from Basel capital rules imply further evidence of its unduly stringent regulations? To what extent is 
a deviation from such stringency justified in adverse conditions?
20 AE Wall, „Stress Tests and Market Discipline“ Banking and Financial Services Policy Report Volume 30 No 9 
September 2011 at page 5 
21  The US Treasury’s interest in purchasing non-performing assets from major financial institutions was formalized as 
the  Troubled  Asset  Relief  Program  (TARP)  which  was  included  in  the  bill  for  the  Emergency  Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA). See  T Hoshi and A K Kashyap, “Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Eight 
Lessons from Japan“ NBER Working Paper No. 14401 August 2009 at page 6. „Section 101 of EESA establishes the 
now well-known Troubled Asset Relief Program (‘‘TARP’’) and authorizes the Treasury to purchase, and to make 
and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from financial institutions up to an amount not exceeding $700 
billion  outstanding at  any one  time,  as  adjusted  for  the  operation  of  the  companion  guarantee  program.“  See 
„TARPOONED: The Recapitalization of the US Financial Industry „October 16, 2008 Dewey and
LeBoeuf Publications <http://www.dl.com> pages 2 and 3 of 18
22  ‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord’ Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21
 Whilst the exclusion of preferred equity in certain exceptional situations may be justified, such a 
practice  nevertheless,  may  encourage  regulatory  arbitrage  whilst  undermining  the  aims  and 
objectives of regulatory capital frameworks. To what extent should deviations from the norm be 
permitted during adverse conditions? Should all banks be rescued? - in the same way as countries in 
need of bail outs  are automatically granted aids?
The answer to this appears to be in the affirmative – where the sustenance of a bank/bank holding 
company or a Member State is crucial to the goals of financial stability of an economy or a Union, 
then necessary and exceptional „emergency“ measures may need to be implemented to prevent 
disastrous  economic  consequences.  The  world  in  which  we  live  today  has  been  dramatically 
transformed in the advent of globalisation, conglomeration, information technology, innovation, the 
growth of complex derivative products and competition. Factors which contribute to the increased 
susceptibility of systemic risks.
Such emergency measures, naturally, are intended, and hopefully are presumed to be „one-offs.“ 
Longer term plans for financial stability which are designed to prevent the re-occurrence of further 
future „emergency scenarios“ - if necessary and possible, will also require consideration.
A re definition of and deviation from standard capital rules in one-off scenarios may be permitted 
where  such  „circumvention“  does  not  deviate  to  a  significant  extent  –  however  where  such 
deviation is capable of resulting in possible distortions and impediments in respect of efforts aimed 
at fostering harmonisation, coordination, as well as other regulatory aims, such practices should be 
discouraged.  The  re  definition  of  qualitative  as  well  as  quantitative  standards  for  capital,  as 
highlighted by Wall, in the implementation of the SCAP,  may appear to constitute a significant 
deviation from the usual methodology - however this could also be permitted in adverse scenarios 
which  occur  on  a  one-off  basis.  A significant  degree  of  judgement  is  involved  in  such  an 
implementation and this constitutes a reason why the SCAP has attracted criticisms.
Conclusion
Concerns attributed to the new Basel III framework relate to its “facilitation of the shadow banking 
system  whilst  constraining  the  bank  sector.”23 The  new,  more  stringent  capital  and  liquidity 
requirements introduced through Basel III are likely to impact the more highly regulated banking 
sector since it is likely that there will be greater incentives to transact in less stringent regulated 
sectors such as the shadow banking system or through less stringent regulated capital instruments.
The  redefinition  of  quantitative  and  qualitative  standards  for  capital,  in  implementing  the 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Programme (SCAP), as illustrated in the paper, demonstrates how 
regulators, independent of shadow banking practices, are prepared to deviate from standard capital 
regulations under adverse scenarios where such regulations prove to be too stringent.
Whilst ongoing debates persist in relation to whether Basel III will exacerbate more problems than 
those which it is intended to rectify,24 a „circumvention“ of Basel III rules in exceptional cases – as 
23  See BRIEF,  „Deutsche Bank CFO Says  Concerned  New Basel  Rules  Allow Shadow Banking System Whilst 
Constraining Bank Sector“ < http://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2011-05/20264700-briefdeutsche-bank-
cfo-says-concerned-new-basel-rules-allow-shadow-banking-system-020.htm
24 See Allen, William A., Chan, Ka Kei, Milne, Alistair K. L. and Thomas, Steve H., Basel III: Is the Cure Worse than 
the Disease? (September 30, 2010) and also Ojo M, „Preparing for Basel IV (whilst commending Basel III) : Why 
liquidity  risks  still  present  a  challenge  to  regulators  in  prudential  supervision  (  Part  II)“  http://mpra.ub.uni-
determined by regulators, is also likely to facilitate regulatory arbitrage. As highlighted under a 
previous  paper,25 central  banks’ expertise  and  the  vital  roles  they  assume  will  be  required  in 
facilitating the objectives of mitigating systemic risks, effective coordination and communication 
between regulators and supervisors, as well as the mitigation of regulatory arbitrage. Further, the 
mitigation of systemic risks through the redress of shadow banking channels which could facilitate 
regulatory  arbitrage  practices,  as  well  as  the  efficient  functioning  of  new  macro  prudential 
frameworks will help ensure that new Basel III standards’ objectives to facilitate greater financial 
stability on a macro prudential  basis are not undermined by possibilities and gaps which could 
foster capital arbitrage and the building up of systemic risks.
muenchen.de/32630/ and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732304 
25 See M Ojo, „Financial Stability, New Macro Prudential Arrangements and Shadow Banking: Regulatory Arbitrage 
and Stringent Basel III Regulations „  Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1859543 and  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/31319/
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